Does it matter that companies are removing ESG targets from executive pay?
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Companies reconsidering ESG targets in executive remuneration is widely interpreted as another sign of the corporate retreat from ESG. But Sepideh Parsa , Ann-Ngoc Nguyen and Minh Nhat Linh Nguyen find that on average, adopting ESG-linked compensation has not been followed by clear improvements in sustainability performance. That does not make sustainability incentives irrelevant but makes their design, transparency and integration with corporate strategy far more important.
In February 2026 the Los Angeles Times reported that Apple had removed environmental measures from its executive pay arrangements, following similar moves by Starbucks, Salesforce, Mastercard and Procter & Gamble. More recently, Reuters reported that Ralph Lauren had replaced sustainability and citizenship measures in its short-term executive incentive plan with targets linked to artificial intelligence.[1]
These developments have prompted concern that removing sustainability measures from executive pay may leave managers with less pressure to consider environmental and social consequences. However, this concern assumes that including environmental, social and governance (ESG) measures previously improved sustainability performance.
Our ongoing research examines this assumption using evidence from European companies. The important question is not simply whether ESG targets are being retained or removed, but whether they are sufficiently demanding, measurable and consequential to influence executive decisions.[2]
Companies with ESG-linked pay may already be different
Linking executive remuneration to sustainability performance is intuitively appealing. Traditional compensation arrangements may encourage executives to prioritise short-term profits and shareholder returns. Environmental and social targets should, in principle, broaden managerial priorities and create personal accountability for corporate sustainability commitments.
Yet the practical importance of these arrangements may not be as substantial as their increasing prevalence suggests. An analysis published by HEC Paris website in 2025 found that, although ESG criteria feature in the compensation arrangements of around 60 per cent of European executives, genuinely binding ESG targets may account for only 2 to 5 per cent of their total incentives. The widespread adoption of ESG-linked pay may therefore overstate its actual influence over executive rewards and decisions.[3]
There is also a fundamental problem in determining whether these arrangements work. Companies adopting ESG-linked pay may already have stronger sustainability policies, better reporting systems, board-level sustainability committees and greater exposure to investor scrutiny.
If these companies subsequently exhibit better environmental or social performance, it is tempting to attribute the difference to executive remuneration. But the relationship may run in the opposite direction. Companies already committed to sustainability may be more likely to introduce ESG measures into executive pay.
Our European evidence calls for caution
Our ongoing analysis, of nearly 500 listed non-financial European companies from 2015 to 2023, supports this cautious interpretation.
When companies are compared with one another, those using ESG-linked executive compensation tend to exhibit stronger sustainability governance and better environmental and social performance. On the surface, this appears to support the argument that ESG-linked pay works.
But the picture changes when we examine what happens within companies after they adopt these arrangements. We do not find statistically reliable average improvements in environmental or social performance following adoption. Nor do we find clear evidence of a subsequent improvement in greenhouse gas emissions intensity.
The contrast is important. Companies with ESG-linked pay may perform better, but this does not mean the mechanism caused the difference. The association may reflect pre-existing characteristics and commitments.
Our findings do not establish that ESG-linked remuneration can never affect corporate behaviour. Carefully constructed incentives may influence particular decisions. They suggest, however, that including an ESG measure in a remuneration policy is not itself evidence that it has produced change.
ESG-linked pay may reveal an existing sustainability orientation more clearly than it creates a new one. Companies with relatively advanced ESG practices may adopt the mechanism, but its introduction does not necessarily shift their performance beyond the path they were already following.
This makes the current debate about removing ESG remuneration measures incomplete. Defending an ineffective or weakly designed target may protect the appearance of accountability without protecting its substance.
An ESG target may not create a meaningful incentive
The influence of ESG-linked remuneration depends on its design. A sustainability measure will exert little influence if it represents only a small fraction of potential pay, is easily achieved or rewards activities that executives would have undertaken anyway.
Some measures reward processes rather than results. Executives may receive credit for publishing a climate strategy, establishing a committee or improving disclosure. These actions may be useful, but they do not necessarily lead to lower emissions or better social outcomes.
The time horizon also matters. Environmental investments may involve substantial expenditure today while producing benefits over several years. Annual bonuses may be poorly suited to such outcomes, while longer-term incentive plans can fail if their assessment periods do not match the company’s transition commitments.
Discretion can also weaken accountability. Remuneration committees often adjust awards or make qualitative judgements about performance. Some flexibility is necessary. But excessive discretion can preserve rewards even when environmental outcomes disappoint.
The effectiveness of ESG-linked pay therefore depends on a target’s materiality, ambition, time horizon and connection to measurable outcomes.
BP illustrates the importance of corporate strategy
BP’s changing approach illustrates why sustainability incentives cannot be evaluated independently of corporate strategy. In March 2025 the Guardian reported that the company had reduced its planned investment in low-carbon activities and renewed its focus on oil and gas. At the same time, BP lowered the weight attached to emissions reductions in its annual executive bonus arrangements while placing greater emphasis on financial performance.[4]
These concerns extended beyond executive remuneration. In 2026 BP faced investor opposition over its attempt to revoke earlier shareholder-approved climate-reporting requirements. Reuters reported that Institutional Shareholder Services, an influential proxy advisor, considered the proposal insufficiently justified, amid wider concerns about the company’s strategic direction.[5]
We use BP as a current illustration rather than as a company-level case study. Its experience nevertheless demonstrates the broader governance problem identified by our analysis. Executive incentives cannot preserve a sustainability strategy that the company itself has chosen to weaken. Remuneration may shape corporate priorities, but it also reflects them.
A carbon target in an executive scorecard carries limited force if the company’s strategic, investment and financial decisions point in a different direction.
Investors should evaluate effects, not labels
The retreat from ESG-linked pay should concern investors when companies remove demanding and transparent measures that hold executives accountable for material sustainability outcomes. But retaining poorly designed ESG metrics is not necessarily evidence of stronger governance.
Investors and remuneration committees should consider whether targets address material sustainability issues, require a genuine change in managerial behaviour and place a meaningful proportion of remuneration at risk. They should also examine whether the assessment period is appropriate, whether outcomes can be independently verified and what happens to executive pay when targets are missed.
Companies should explain why particular measures have been introduced, revised or removed. If a target has failed to influence behaviour, replacing it may be justified, but the board should explain what will provide accountability in its place.
The debate should therefore move beyond counting how many companies include ESG measures in executive remuneration. Adoption is an input, not an outcome. Removing a target is not automatically evidence of irresponsibility, just as retaining one is not automatically evidence of commitment.
The real test is whether executive pay changes the decisions companies make. Our European evidence suggests that, on average, adopting ESG-linked compensation has not been followed by clear improvements in sustainability performance. That finding does not make sustainability incentives irrelevant. It makes their design, transparency and integration with corporate strategy far more important.
This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of Economics. You are agreeing with our comment policy when you leave a comment.